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As a device of argumentative anticipation, prolepsis use generally is considered a positive 
rhetorical strategy. Turning to the Climate Stewardship Act (CSA) of 2003, this article 
contributes to our understanding of environmental communication, political argumen­
tation, and rhetorical theory by examining how proleptic miscalculation can actually 
produce devastating consequences against one’s cause when used as a source of invention. 
Proponents of the CSA relied on creating proleptic arguments grounded in a scientific 
understanding of climate change to such an extent that they mistakenly downplayed the 
economic arguments against the Act. This orchestrated miscalculation was encouraged 
and strengthened by key US senators. This article concludes by discussing contributions 
to scholarly understanding of prolepsis use in public policymaking and offers practical 
suggestions for improving communication in future considerations of environmental 
legislation. 
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In June of 2001, the US, under the leadership of President George W. Bush, isolated 
itself from the international community by refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, a 
document it helped create (Bush, 2001). Reflecting a reversal of President Bush’s 
campaign promises to cap US carbon dioxide emissions, the decision to permanently 
withdraw the US from future Kyoto negotiations disappointed many environmen­
talists (Henneberger, 2001). In the months preceding President Bush’s speech, cabinet 
and press officials hinted at the administration’s position. In late March, press 
secretary Ari Fleischer noted that President Bush ‘‘does not support the Kyoto treaty’’ 
and Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christie Todd Whitman added 
the US had ‘‘no interest’’ in supporting the Protocol (Jehl, 2001, p. 22). Despite the 
predictability of President Bush’s decision, activists could not help but feel even more 
pessimistic about the future when scientists released two new reports. 
In May, the Bush Administration sent a letter to the National Research Council 
(NRC) requesting the group conduct a review of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (2001) reports to help the Administration identify ‘‘the 
greatest certainties and uncertainties’’ in climate-change science (NRC, 2001, 
Appendix A). The NRC’s response stated: ‘‘Greenhouse gases are accumulating in 
Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures 
and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising’’ (NRC, 
2001, p. 1). In September, the IPCC released another report stating that ‘‘there is new 
and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years is 
attributable to human activities’’ (2001, p. 5). In late 1990s and early 2000s, scientists 
told policymakers they needed to do something about climate change, but US 
policymakers were not prepared to have that ‘‘something’’ be the Kyoto Protocol. 
Although multilateral action to address climate change seemed unlikely, in 2003, 
two US Senators who were then from different sides of the aisle, John McCain (R-AZ) 
and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), came together to propose a US policy aimed at 
reducing global warming gas (GWG) emissions (Lieberman is currently holding 
office as an Independent). They created the Climate Stewardship Act (CSA), 
popularly known as the McCain-Lieberman bill. The Act (S.139) once again brought 
global climate change to the forefront of congressional environmental politics. 
With the introduction of the CSA in January of 2003, those in favor of slowing 
global climate change had a number of reasons to view environmental policymaking 
in the US with a sense of optimism. Not only was the CSA being proposed by two 
prominent politicians who potentially had the reputations to get the policy enacted, 
but the CSA had bi-partisan and public support as well. According to a 2003 Gallup 
poll, 75% of Americans favored ‘‘imposing mandatory controls on carbon dioxide 
emissions and other greenhouse gases’’ (Symons, 2003). Public opinion in 2003 was 
also favorable toward the bill itself. In an October 2003 Zogby poll, 78% of Americans 
believed the US should do something to reduce its release of GWGs, with 75% 
supporting the CSA in particular (Zogby International, 2003). Dozens of editorials 
appeared in periodicals throughout the country arguing in favor of passing the CSA 
(Excerpts of editorials on global warming 2005; Symons, 2003). The bill also gained 
the support of 155 mayors, the National Farmers Union, the League of Conservation 
Voters, the League of Women Voters, 175 sportsmen groups, and a variety of religious 
organizations (Senators McCain and Lieberman reintroduce the climate stewardship 
act, 2005; The Climate Stewardship Act, 2004). Perhaps most surprising was the 
support given by various corporate interests, including insurance giant Swiss Re, the 
American Gas Association, Dupont, General Electric, Maytag, and Trane (Symons, 
2003; The Climate Stewardship Act, 2004). However, despite widespread support, 
opponents ultimately defeated the Act on the Senate floor in October of 2003 by a 
slim margin of 55 to 43. 
Following the vote, a number of puzzling questions remained unanswered: If there 
was so much public support for legislation aimed at reducing GWG emissions, as well 
as bi-partisan sponsorship of the bill by two prominent Senators, why did the CSA 
fail? How did CSA opponents defeat the bill? Could CSA supporters, including 
McCain and Lieberman, have done more to ensure the passage of the CSA? In 
addressing these questions, I contend that the CSA defeat in October 2003 was 
significantly influenced by the rhetorical and argumentative miscalculation of bill 
supporters, including prolepsis use that was intimately connected to Senate norms of 
witness selection. This is not to say material interests and power dynamics do not 
matter. On the contrary, this article focuses on the discursive construction of power 
by examining how prolepsis was used by CSA proponents. While prolepsis, a strategy 
of argumentative anticipation, is generally considered a positive rhetorical strategy, 
this article contributes to our understanding of rhetorical theory by examining how 
proleptic miscalculation can actually produce devastating consequences against one’s 
cause when that miscalculation becomes a topos of legislative argument. Proponents 
of the CSA relied on creating proleptic arguments grounded in a scientific 
understanding of the issue to such an extent that they mistakenly downplayed the 
economic arguments against the Act. However, this misstep was encouraged. McCain, 
in his selection of witnesses and steering of the discourse through his use of question 
and answer sessions, pushed for anticipation of scientific arguments across the 
testimonies. Proponents of the CSA had the inventional resources available to them 
to counter their opponents’ arguments, but simply failed to use them in their 
rhetorical orchestration. 
The CSA also deserves our attention for environmental policy reasons. As the first 
serious climate-change policy with potentially far-reaching economic consequences 
to be engaged by the US since the Kyoto Protocol, the rhetorical dimensions of the 
CSA’s failure in 2003 offer lessons about the procedural constraints associated with 
Congressional policymaking that can influence the reception and potential success of 
future environmental legislation. According to public policy scholars Frank Fischer 
and John Forrester, ‘‘As massive environmental problems loom before us, political 
talk will become more and not less important’’ (1993, p. 13). The New York Times has 
called the CSA the ‘‘best-known brand in climate-change legislation’’ Congress has 
had to consider (Barringer & Revkin, 2007, p. A24). The notion that proleptic 
miscalculation could actually harm the interest of the rhetors doing the constructing 
is an important one, given that virtually all hearings involve some form of 
argumentative anticipation and are grounded within institutional norms. 
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. First, I begin by 
discussing the development of the CSA as it progressed from its first committee 
introduction to the vote on the Senate floor in October 2003. After considering the 
CSA legislative history, I briefly discuss prolepsis as a rhetorical figure. Next, I analyze 
the arguments and strategies used by CSA proponents and their opponents during 
the hearings and floor debate. Finally, I turn to statements made by senators 
following the vote to further illustrate the rhetorical complexity involved in 
environmental policymaking about global climate change. The proponents may be 
succeeding in terms of science, but they are failing in terms of rhetorical and political 
action. 
The CSA of 2003 
When the CSA was first introduced to the Senate in January of 2003, it contained two 
phases for implementation. Phase I consisted of legislation aimed at reducing GWG 
emissions to their 2000 levels by 2010. Phase II of the bill, the most drastic, included a 
system of tradable allowances that required emission rollbacks to 1990 greenhouse 
gas levels once phase I was completed, a task that was closer to the objective of the 
Kyoto Protocol. In essence, the CSA of 2003 attempted to use the profit motive of 
corporations to drive an environmentally friendly bill. 
Within weeks of the bill’s unveiling, numerous economic reports evaluated the Act. 
Responding to senators’ requests, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) released an assessment report in June. The results 
were mixed: With adoption of the Act US emissions would return to 2000 levels by 
2025 and the US would see a decreased dependence on foreign oil. However, the DOE 
also projected that the Act would cause significant price increases for nearly every 
fossil fuel and fossil fuel product when compared to a projection without the CSA in 
place (27% for gas, 46% for electricity, 31% for petroleum products, 485% for coal) 
and that the US gross domestic product (GDP) would be reduced $109 billion (EIA, 
2003, p. xii-xviii). CSA authors quickly amended the Act by eliminating Phase II of the 
bill*the section that required emission rollbacks to 1990 levels and was the primary 
cause of the price increases estimated in the DOE report. Two weeks later, the Joint 
Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) also released an economic analysis of the CSA. Their conclusions 
were far more financially tolerable than the DOE report: the cost of the amended Act 
could be a rather minimal discomfort of $20 per year per household (Paltsey, Reilly, 
Jacoby, Ellerman, & Tay, 2003, p. 27). It seemed as though the CSA supporters had a 
bill they could now argue was financially reasonable. However, in October, just before 
McCain and Lieberman were to introduce the bill onto the floor of the Senate, Charles 
River Associates, a Boston-based financial and economic consulting firm, concurred 
with the DOE assessment of double-digit price increases when they examined the bill’s 
effects with Phase II included in the economic models. It also acknowledged the bill’s 
costs were much lower when Phase II was left out (Smith, Bernstein, & Montgomery, 
2003, , p. 3). In terms of economic reports, both sides possessed inventional resources 
to construct their arguments for and against the CSA.In addition to being subjected to 
economic scrutiny, the CSA also had to survive congressional hearings before debuting 
on the Senate floor. In 2003, as chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, McCain held three hearings to build his case for the CSA’s 
passage. The initial hearing was held on January 8, 2003, the committee’s first meeting 
of the year. This bill was also the first business item the committee considered. 
The second hearing was held before the subcommittee on Science, Technology, and 
Space on June 6, 2003. The last was held on October 1, 2003, before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 
Over the course of these hearings, McCain invited dozens of witnesses*mostly 
scientists*to testify about the current state of climate-change science, the CSA, and 
what other nations were doing to combat climate change. However, testimony was 
heavily slanted in favor of the CSA, primarily because McCain was the one doing 
most of the selecting. The obvious one-sided nature of the hearings is not an unusual 
occurrence; Senate norms and structural rules have allowed committee chairs and 
staff members to use their influence to determine the general tone of hearings for 
decades, deciding ‘‘who should testify, when, and on what issues’’ (Oleszek, 1978, p. 
68). Indeed, chairs often use their power to ‘‘give positions of privilege and potential 
influence’’ to witnesses (Gross, 1953, p. 311). Tarla Rai Peterson has noted in her 
study on institutional authority in Senate subcommittee hearings that ‘‘a hearing 
provides opportunity for groups to frame a situation around their own interests’’ 
(1988, p. 261). With an interested committee chair, it is no surprise that the witnesses 
who are selected to testify often concur with the chair’s opinions on the given topic, 
creating a ‘‘sectional or group bias’’ (Galloway, 1953, p. 299). Some scholars have 
even noted the way hearings have been used as a test ground for arguments before 
presenting them on the floor during open debate (Butler, 1995). However, unlike 
previous studies where policymakers were documented using hearings to successfully 
adjust their floor arguments, CSA proponents met with failure. The CSA was brought 
onto the floor of the Senate on October 29, 2003, and defeated on October 30, 2003. 
In the remainder of this article, I turn to these three hearings and the two-day floor 
debate to illustrate how CSA supporters’ miscalculation paralyzed passage of the new 
policy and how potentially useful inventional resources, such as economic reports, 
were rhetorically (mis)handled. The Senate norm of allowing committee chairs to 
determine the tone of the rhetoric produced during the hearings via witness selection 
created the conditions to sustain the use of prolepsis as not just a figure, but also as a 
source of invention. However, before turning to the actual texts, a consideration of 
how prolepsis is usually defined and used is in order. 
Argumentative Anticipation: Prolepsis as a Figure and Source of Invention 
Prolepsis, following Richard Lanham’s definition, is the rhetorical tactic of 
‘‘foreseeing and forestalling objections.’’ According to Lanham, this foreseeing and 
forestalling involves a ‘‘preconception’’ and ‘‘anticipation’’ of arguments against one’s 
position (Lanham, 1991, p. 120). Rhetoricians and persuasion scholars have discussed 
prolepsis in a number of ways, but they do not necessarily use the same terms. 
Although prolepsis is used synonymously with a number of Greek and Latin figures 
(e.g., prokatalepsis and anticipatio), Michael Leff and Jean Goodwin note that each of 
these terms simply ‘‘designates minute differences in form and function’’ (2000, p. 
59). Although I agree with Leff and Goodwin’s assessment, a brief exploration of the 
origins and nature of these differences is in order. 
In ancient Greece and Rome, prolepsis was often understood by orators to have 
two different meanings. First, prolepsis could be defined as the use of an anticipatory 
figure at the sentence level. In his text Greek Grammar, Herbert Smyth notes that the 
ancient Greeks used prolepsis when ‘‘the subject of the dependent clause is often 
anticipated and made the object of the verb of the principle clause’’ (1973, p. 488). 
Smyth (1973) offers a classic example: ‘‘Consider the lilies of the field how they grow’’ 
(p. 683). However, Smyth also notes a second meaning: ‘‘Prolepsis is also used to 
designate the anticipation of an opponent’s arguments and objections’’ (1973, 
p. 683). Some scholars have noted how prolepsis in this second definition is ‘‘a 
synonym for procatalepsis, the anticipation and answering of an opponent’s 
argument’’ (Myers & Simms, 1985, p. 243). Heinrich Lausberg also calls anticipatio 
‘‘proleptic defensive anticipation of the opponent’s argument’’ (1998, p. 383). These 
two definitions of prolepsis initially formulated by the ancient Greeks continued to 
be used by the Romans. However, it was the second that received the most treatment 
in many of the classic Roman texts. Some of the most famous Roman rhetoricians 
were well-versed in the use of prolepsis as an argumentative and inventional device of 
anticipation. In his Institutes of Eloquence, Quintilian, following Cicero’s lead, called 
prolepsis a kind of ‘‘anticipation, by which I mean our answering of objections which 
we foresee’’ (Quintilian, 1805, p. 161). However, prolepsis is not a figure that has been 
left to the pages of rhetorical history books. Prolepsis is also being engaged in 
contemporary texts (Bridgeman, 2005; van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2000). 
Social scientists concerned with persuasive effects of communication have 
contributed substantially to scholarly understanding of the proleptic strategy in 
their work on ‘‘one-sided’’ versus ‘‘two-sided’’ messages. By one-sided messages, this 
group of scholars refers to communication that only uses evidence and arguments 
‘‘favoring the recommended conclusion.’’ Thus, two-sided arguments are those that 
address evidence and arguments both for and against a position (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1996, p. 74). Refutational two-sided messages contain counterarguments to the 
communicator’s position or desired outcome, but are addressed in a way that favors 
the communicator. Early studies conducted in the 1950s by Carl I. Hovland, Arthur 
A. Lumsdaine, and Fred D. Sheffield (1967) indicated ‘‘presenting arguments on both 
sides of an issue was found to be more effective than giving arguments supporting the 
point being made, in the case of individuals who were initially opposed to the point 
of view being presented’’ (p. 94). For those who were already convinced of this point 
of view, ‘‘the inclusion of arguments on both sides was less effective’’ when compared 
to the one-sided experimental condition (Hovland, et al., 1967, pp. 94-95). In other 
words, early studies indicated prolepsis should be used when a rhetor is attempting to 
convince an audience that is against his or her position. 
Following the studies of the 1950s, one-sided versus two-sided messages have 
received a great deal of attention. In his meta-analysis on the subject, Daniel O’Keefe 
(1999) gathered over 107 studies for inclusion in his review. O’Keefe indicates that 
the research conducted on one-sided versus two-sided messages no longer supports 
the early contention that initial audience position matters. Instead, what matters is 
whether or not the two-sided message is refutational (does the rhetoric simply 
identify opposing arguments, or does the rhetor identify and refute the arguments) 
and whether or not the message is commercial advertising. O’Keefe found that 
refutational two-sided messages are more persuasive than one-sided or non­
refutational two-sided messages in non-commercial messages. In other words, using 
prolepsis is generally more persuasive than not. 
Although prolepsis has been labeled in a variety of ways, it is generally viewed by 
commentators as good rhetorical strategy. Quintilian (1805) noted that prolepsis 
could be of ‘‘great service in a pleading’’ (p. 161). Leff and Goodwin (2000) argue 
Abraham Lincoln’s success as a rhetor is, at least partially, attributable to his use of 
rhetorical figures such as prolepsis. However, as we shall see in the case of the CSA, 
using prolepsis is not always a positive feature of discourse. Hovland et al. (1967) 
were right about one all-too-brief observation: 
An important incidental finding was that the absence of one relevant argument 
against the stand taken by the programs was more noticeable in the presentation 
using arguments on both sides than in the presentation in which only one side was 
discussed. (p. 95) 
As we shall see, the absence of relevant arguments in the CSA proponents’ discourse 
worked against their cause. When combined with the selection norms of the Senate, 
proleptic miscalculation can be sustained across the testimonials, producing 
devastating results against a rhetor’s desired outcome. 
Scientific Argumentation and Proleptic Miscalculation 
From January to October 2003, supporters and opponents of the CSA delivered 
hundreds of arguments. What many of the supporters had in common was their 
coupling of scientific arguments and a sense of argumentative anticipation. The 
decision to focus on scientific arguments was primarily a result of proleptic strategy. 
This general coupling is not unusual given the previous decade of climate change 
discourse in the US Congress. Ross Gelbspan has argued effectively that scientific 
challenges and the creation of scientific uncertainty within the House and Senate 
were common practices from the late 1980s through the late 1990s (1998, pp. 67-82, 
198-237). Thus, the decision of CSA proponents to anticipate scientific challenges 
should not come as a surprise. However, the rhetoric of CSA proponents suffered 
from a significant rhetorical miscalculation: proponents engaged and committed to a 
form of prolepsis that left the CSA devastatingly vulnerable to economic attacks. 
From the very first hearing held in January of 2003 before the Senate Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation Committee, CSA supporters chose to frame their 
arguments from a scientific vantage point. In the first paragraph of McCain’s 
introductory remarks, he referenced the National Academy of Sciences report, 
especially where it noted, ‘‘gases are accumulating in the Earth’s atmosphere as a 
result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean 
temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising’’ (FDCH, 2003c, p. 2). By 
focusing on evidence that tells us climate change is a ‘‘fact,’’ McCain revealed his 
belief that science was clearly on his side and that the science relating to global 
climate change has produced certain knowledge. McCain went on to paraphrase the 
findings of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, researchers at the 
University of Texas, Weslyan University, Stanford University, and the journal Nature, 
all in an attempt to show climate change was a real phenomenon taking place right 
now (FDCH, 2003c, p. 2). By piggybacking on the credibility of well-respected 
scientific authorities, McCain attempted to convince his audience that scientific 
evidence and accuracy were the criteria it should be using to determine whether or 
not the CSA should be passed. For McCain, the science was settled and there was no 
reason the Senate should vote against the bill. 
Although it seems clear McCain’s introductory comments addressed scientific 
issues, it is not until the second page of his arguments that one understands how 
prolepsis plays a role in McCain’s decision to feature heavily scientific arguments. 
Given Gelbspan’s observations about the constant and consistent scientific challenges 
from climate-change skeptics in previous hearings, one would suspect an experienced 
senator such as McCain would be familiar with the legislative history. However, we 
should not let the coupling of prolepsis and the scientific arguments rest on an 
assumption. McCain reveals his coupling of prolepsis and scientific argumentation in 
the following: 
The United States must do something. But it must also do the right thing. Many 
have focused on what we do not know or the uncertainties around climate change. 
I prefer a more sound and scientific approach of starting with what is known or 
given and then proceeding to solve the problem at hand. (FDCH, 2003c, p. 3) 
For McCain, the most important thought, the thought he decides to place in the 
recency position of his speech, is that the ‘‘many’’ who have focused on the 
‘‘uncertainties’’ are in the wrong; a ‘‘sound and scientific approach’’ is the one he has 
adopted. By the end of McCain’s remarks the relationship between anticipating 
scientific arguments and the decision to preemptively shore up the scientific case for 
the existence of climate change is clear. 
Although McCain’s decision to feature scientific arguments appears to be linked to 
an anticipation of skeptics’ arguments, McCain also uses his position during the 
question and answer sessions to highlight this linkage. For example, when James 
Mahoney, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and Director 
of the US Climate Change Science Program, attempted to widen the discussion 
beyond scientific considerations, McCain’s first question was about the scientific 
status of global climate change (FDCH, 2003c, p. 13). Time and again, McCain 
appeared certain the CSA would be challenged primarily on scientific grounds. 
Following McCain’s lead and adopting a similar anticipatory mindset, other 
Senators and witnesses also used the scientific frame to situate their arguments. 
Scientific arguments saturate the texts of the hearings primarily because CSA 
proponents also engaged in a collective, rhetorical construction of their opponents’ 
arguments. CSA supporters assumed the opponents would continue to attack the 
legitimacy of climate-change science or suggest scientists and Congress did not know 
enough about it to make informed policy decisions. For example, Senator Ron 
Wyden (D-OR) summarily proclaimed in his opening statement, ‘‘The fact of the 
matter is, there is clear evidence, with respect to what is causing the problem’’ 
(FDCH, 2003c, p. 3). Similar to McCain’s remarks, Wyden decides to feature the 
science first. Also like McCain, Wyden’s reason for featuring scientific arguments* 
anticipation of skeptical counterarguments*appears later in his commentary: ‘‘If 
you really think about it, what they are constantly saying is that we just can’t get any 
further than research. We deny, in effect, all of what you all have said, that you can 
have these positive programs’’ (FDCH, 2003c, p. 31). Wyden’s ‘‘they’’ are unnamed 
individuals, but he is certain about the kind of argument that has been the most 
problematic for climate-change believers. Throughout the first hearing, CSA 
supporters and witnesses echoed similar assessments. Climate-change believers 
have been challenged in the past and will likely be challenged again. However, ‘‘clear 
evidence’’ exists about causes; global climate change is a matter of ‘‘fact;’’ the science 
is ‘‘unchallengeable.’’ Arguments rooted in science began to take on the flavor of 
arguments rooted in a rhetoric of certainty. 
In the March and October hearings, the same proleptic/scientific argument 
coupling was used yet again. Dr. Antonio Busalacchi of the NRC spent the 
overwhelming majority of his testimonial time focusing on ‘‘what most scientists 
believe to be true.’’ Busalacchi summarized: ‘‘Despite the uncertainties, however, there 
is widespread agreement that the observed warming is real, and particularly strong 
within the past 20 years.’’ Busalacchi’s statement was supported by ‘‘a diverse array of 
evidence’’ and ‘‘instrumental records,’’ leaving him with ‘‘no doubt that humans have 
modified the abundance of key greenhouse gases in the atmosphere’’ (FDCH, 2003a, 
p. 6). In a telling exchange with Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL), and similar to McCain 
and Wyden’s speeches, Busalacchi’s anticipation of skeptical counterarguments can 
also be observed: 
MR. BUSALACCHI: I made the remark that the press portrays our problem
 
ashaving a community over here in favor of global warming and a community over
 
here -
SEN. NELSON: And that’s not the way it is.
 
MR. BUSALACCHI: No, it’s like this.
 
SEN. NELSON: It’s 95 to 5.
 
MR. BUSALACCHI: The preponderance of evidence is way over here that
 
globalwarming is real, and it’s time now to take action.
 
SEN. NELSON: Do the 5 percent really believe it, or are they paid to say that?
 
MR. BUSALACCHI: Yes. (Laughter.) (FDCH, 2003b, p. 15)
 
Embedded within this comical exchange is the construction of an unidentified group 
of skeptics who are paid by fossil fuel special interests and believe global warming is 
not happening. However, the laughter and quantification indicate proponents of the 
bill are in the right. The ‘‘preponderance of evidence’’ and 95% of the world’s 
scientists are on their side. 
Expanding on Busalacchi’s testimony, Dr. Tom Wigley of the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research focused on the twentieth century warming by examining 
satellite data. Concurrent with Busalacchi, Wigley concluded: ‘‘We can’t explain the 
twentieth century warming unless we included human influences’’ (FDCH, 2003a, 
p. 8). Also similar to those who spoke before him, Dr. Wigley constructed the CSA 
opponents and their anticipated arguments: ‘‘But there are many people who are 
opposed to us taking any action who will claim that this is just one of those actions of 
history, exactly as the ice age was a [sic] well’’ (FDCH, 2003b, p. 10). Like so many 
other CSA supporters at the hearings, Wigley, in anticipating the well-known skeptic 
argument that humans cannot possibly disrupt or significantly influence the natural 
cycle of ice ages, informs his decision to emphasize science through his use of 
prolepsis. 
From the beginning to the end of the hearing process, CSA proponents were 
featuring arguments situated in scientific rhetoric because of their common 
anticipation of what was to come. Global climate change was happening, humans 
were the cause, the consequences were negative, we must act now, and someone is 
going to challenge everything we know as scientifically true. For CSA supporters, 
the scientific evidence needed to be featured in the hearings not only to convince 
those who were unaware of the scientific state of global climate change research 
but also to create the conditions that would make it easier for bill supporters to 
fend off arguments from ‘‘others’’ who wished to challenge the legitimacy or 
certainty of the science. Thus, the focus of CSA supporters was not so much on 
the trivial uncertainties, but on the ‘‘sound and scientific approach’’ that 
ultimately should have allowed the Senate to take action by voting in favor of 
the CSA. 
Arguments Rooted in Economics and Misunderstanding 
By the time the CSA reached the floor of the Senate in late October, bill supporters 
positioned their arguments during the hearings in a way to give the appearance 
science was on their side. However, the primary arguments against the CSA had 
already surfaced in the hearings. Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) expressed his 
concerns in January: ‘‘I’m not going to participate in any kind of program that 
exports more jobs from this country. And we’ve already got a flood of jobs leaving 
our country. And I’m just not going to contribute to that’’ (FDCH, 2003c, p. 5). CSA 
supporters did not engage Burns’ statement in the hearings process directly, but they 
were soon to find out others were in agreement with his position. What was to ensue 
on the floor of the Senate was nothing short of a discursive reversal from what had 
taken place during the hearings: scientific arguments were about to take a backseat to 
economic ones. In other words, the use of prolepsis was about to backfire on CSA 
supporters. 
Senator Lieberman began the first day of the floor debate by relying on the 
science strategy CSA supporters had used throughout the hearings. However, 
Lieberman’s opening statement was only one of the few times the economic 
arguments in favor of the CSA were mentioned. Following his prepared remarks, 
Senator McCain posed a question to Senator Lieberman to bring the focus back to 
the scientific frame: 
SEN. MCCAIN: Is the Senator aware the major attack on this legislation will be
 
related to the validity of the entire issue of climate change?
 
SEN. LIEBERMAN: I expect that will be true. (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 8)
 
McCain then asked a follow-up ‘‘question’’ that was more of a speech. He noted the 
findings of the 2001 IPCC and the Bush Administration’s request for the 2001 NAS 
report that both pointed to ‘‘human activities’’ as the chief cause for climate change 
(Congressional Record, 2003, p. 8). After nearly 30 lines of text dedicated to the science 
behind climate change, McCain did not really end with a question at all: ‘‘I ask my 
colleague to comment on that’’ (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 9). Lieberman replied: 
‘‘I expect, unfortunately, that we will debate the science here’’ (Congressional Record, 
2003, p. 9). The term ‘‘unfortunately’’ is key to understanding Lieberman’s, and, I 
would argue, the CSA proponents’ position because it illustrates the high level of 
certainty CSA supporters had in regards to climate-change science and the kinds of 
argument they would encounter. It would be unfortunate for them to have to debate 
the validity of something they already assumed was true. As it turns out, the 
arguments McCain, Lieberman, and CSA supporters expected to hear were not the 
primary threat. Opponents were finally going to have their chance to engage the CSA 
supporters in open debate. 
Led by Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), opponents to the CSA shifted the evaluative 
mode from one concerning questions of science to one primarily concerned with 
economics. Although Senator Inhofe, in his first floor statement following Senator 
Lieberman, briefly and boldly challenged the scientific arguments that had been 
constructed by CSA supporters by noting ‘‘some of the things they are saying are 
untrue,’’ Inhofe did far more to set up the upcoming economic arguments by yielding 
the floor to Senator Kit Bond (R-MO) (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 9). Bond set 
the stage for the rest of the debate with the following: ‘‘I strongly believe this bill will 
cripple our economy, cripple our communities, and financially cripple many of our 
struggling families’’ (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 10). For CSA opponents, this was 
not going to be a debate about science or a little economic discomfort; this was a 
debate about ‘‘crippling’’ an otherwise healthy economy. The CSA was not just a bad 
idea, it was disabling. 
The trope of economic health and disability can be seen throughout the debate and 
constitutes the majority of CSA opponents’ arguments. Focusing on the numbers that 
illustrated the disabling potential of the CSA proved to be a key way of arguing 
against the CSA. Senator Bond then referenced the EIA report: ‘‘Experts conclude 
that the legislation under consideration to cut carbon dioxide in electric powerplants 
[sic] would cost the economy over $100 billion. That is one-zero-zero billion dollars. 
Experts also estimate that the electricity bills would go up by about 40 percent’’ 
(Congressional Record, 2003, p. 10). Later in his speech Bond also argued the CSA will 
‘‘cost millions of American jobs’’ and that it would ‘‘cause a cumulative decrease in 
the gross domestic product of $1.4 trillion’’ (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 11). After 
hammering the CSA with economic statistics, Bond once again returned to the trope 
of ill health: ‘‘The effect of this bill would be, first, to send our economy back into 
recession, then strip the nation of hundreds of thousands of jobs, and then increase 
the cost of heating our homes. I, frankly, cannot think of a better combination of ills’’ 
(Congressional Record, 2003, p. 11). The expected arguments about science were only 
a secondary theme in the first speeches of the October floor debate. Instead, 
economic health arguments about ‘‘ills’’ were the primary source of resistance against 
voting for the CSA, even though, as we shall see, those very arguments were based on 
a faulty understanding of the bill. 
When given the chance to respond to the first volley of attacks, supporters of the 
CSA had difficulty answering all of the arguments. McCain rightly attempted to 
clarify the confusion extending from Senator’s Bond’s use of the EIA. Recall that the 
EIA report only estimated the CSA’s effects if both Phases I and II were in effect. 
McCain briefly noted, ‘‘That was a well-written presentation by my colleague from 
Missouri. Unfortunately, his analysis of the bill is not the bill that is before the Senate. 
But other than that, it was pretty convincing’’ (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 11). 
McCain attempts to shift the economic debate to favor the CSA by noting how Bond 
did not address the newest version of the bill. However, the economic arguments 
from opponents continued to reference the EIA evaluations of the old version of the 
CSA. 
Climate Stewardship Act opponents refused to examine the analyses that suggested 
the CSA would only have minimal economic consequences with Phase II eliminated 
from the legislation. Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) continued to reference the 
EIA report despite McCain’s brief attempt to clarify the matter (Congressional Record, 
2003, p. 21). Toward the end of the first day of debate, Senator Inhofe turned the 
misuse of EIA reports against CSA supporters by suggesting opponents who were 
preparing arguments against the CSA’s passage had been, in some way, sandbagged: 
It is a little unfair and unrealistic*and I want to make sure everyone interested in 
this issue understands, we have had the McCain-Lieberman bill for months now, 
and we have all had a chance to study it. The fact they changed this bill and they are 
saying you are not talking about the bill before you now, that did not happen until 
11:53 this morning. We have not had a chance to see it. (Congressional Record, 2003, 
p. 27) 
Although daily changes to any bill, as long as they follow proper amending 
procedures, are allowed in the Senate, Inhofe’s accusations of unfairness might carry 
weight if opponents were truly unable to prepare for the debate. However, the 
changes to the bill were publicly announced by McCain during the October 1 hearing, 
well before the debate on October 29 and 30 (FDCH, 2003b, 2). The economic 
analyses from MIT, which included scenarios that eliminated Phase II, were also 
widely available well before the debate. Nonetheless, CSA supporters did little to 
engage opponents who reiterated the economic arguments against the original 
version of the CSA when it was the newer version that was being considered on the 
floor. 
In addition to Senator McCain’s brief attempt to clarify the economic confusion 
about the most recent version of the bill, Senators Lieberman and Diane Feinstein 
(D-CA) also made attempts to draw attention to the numbers that favored the CSA 
(Congressional Record, 2003, p. 55). However, McCain’s brief correction, Lieberman’s 
attempts to introduce the MIT report into the record, and Feinstein’s attempt to 
reveal bias constituted only a small portion of the overall debate and could do little to 
stop the flawed numbers from entering the discussion. On the second day of the 
debate, Senator Voinovich appeared to have an answer to the ‘‘your economic claims 
are irrelevant’’ argument: 
I would also like to address statements by Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman 
that because they offered a substitute to their original version of S. 139, all the 
comments and analyses cited by opponents of this bill, including myself, are 
irrelevant. That statement could not be further from the truth. I refer to a letter I 
recently received from many of the stakeholders against S. 139. (Congressional 
Record, 2003, p. 67) 
After reading an excerpt from the letter testifying to the harsh economic conditions 
that would result with adoption of S. 139, Senator Voinovich asked the letter, in its 
entirety, be printed into the record. Voinovich attempted to make it appear as though 
there were independent economic reasons not based on the EIA report to vote against 
the CSA. However, after examining the letter, it is clear that the document’s 
conclusions were based on the ‘‘Energy Information Administration’’ (Congressional 
Record, 2003, p. 67). Because audience members did not really have an opportunity to 
see the letter or hear it read in its entirety during the debate, Voinovich gave the 
impression his arguments came from concerned citizens testifying about their 
potential economic losses rather than the EIA report. 
Despite realizing what was happening in terms of the economic arguments, CSA 
proponents already made the decision to continue emphasizing their argumentative 
strengths: the science. Halfway into the debate, Senator Lieberman actually started to 
view the refusal of CSA opponents to primarily engage in a science-oriented 
argument as progress: ‘‘I suppose in some sense we are progressing in this 
disagreement. I would rather disagree about the impact of the bill than disagree 
about the science that I think says so clearly the world has a problem. The globe is 
warming. It is the result of human activity’’ (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 28). 
Notice that Lieberman shifts from discussing the economic impact of the bill to 
emphasizing the science. Considering that Lieberman was one of the primary voices 
on the floor of the Senate who discussed the economic benefits of the bill and argued 
against the misunderstood arguments of the CSA opponents, this shift is quite 
significant. CSA supporters were left without a substantial number of voices on the 
first day of debates to take on the economic issues. 
The Rhetorical Complexity of Proleptic Miscalculation 
Although Senate debates ultimately come to a decision of voting ‘‘aye’’ or ‘‘nay,’’ 
individual reactions are often far more diverse than a vote indicates. Even in my 
analysis of the CSA hearings and debates, I have paid careful attention to the two 
dominant rhetorical postures that emerged from the texts. However, following the 
CSA’s defeat in October 2003, a number of senators revealed their reasons for voting 
against the bill. It is in these final texts that one finds a host of complex reasoning 
processes at work despite the initial appearance of only a two-sided debate. 
In the CSA debate, senators cannot simply be divided into two categories of for 
and against. Not only did some senators completely agree with McCain or Inhofe, 
but, some also found both arguments equally persuasive. If McCain said the science 
was right and Inhofe said the economics were wrong, some senators concluded both 
were correct. When put in that situation, many decided to play it safe and vote 
against the bill*despite their belief that global climate change was real*because they 
believed something better could be developed. For example, Senator Arlen Specter 
(R-PA) acknowledged ‘‘global warming is a matter of great international importance,’’ 
but voted against the bill because ‘‘national and state economies’’ are ‘‘very fragile at 
the moment’’ (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 99). Senator Lincoln (D-AR) echoed a 
similar reasoning process: 
Mr. President, although I am extremely concerned about global warming, I voted 
against Mr. McCain and Lieberman’s Climate Stewardship Act. My chief concern 
was that this bill would raise gas and electric prices at a time when Arkansas’s 
economy is struggling to recover and many residents from my state are finding it 
difficult to make ends meet. (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 100) 
Senator Max Baucus (R-MT) shared his opinion that ‘‘global climate change is a 
serious problem,’’ while also believing the CSA would have ‘‘impacts on my state, 
particularly agriculture, from increased gas prices’’ (Congressional Record, 2003, p. 
101). These comments were generated despite studies indicating the CSA would only 
have a minimal economic impact (e.g., Paltsey et al., 2003, p. 2003). And there is an 
element of timing that becomes vital to understanding resistance to the CSA. The 
potential for a drain on the economy was too much for many policymakers, especially 
middle-of-the-road senators, to risk in light of a potentially unending war on terror, 
recovering state economies that had gone through recent recessions, and rising gas 
prices. Put simply, CSA proponents did not do enough to preempt and address the 
economic arguments or the timing of the bill. Given the political and economic 
context, it is remarkable CSA proponents did not sufficiently anticipate economic 
arguments from their colleagues, further emphasizing the importance of anticipating 
the most powerful arguments against one’s position. Opponents successfully stifled 
passage of the CSA, not because their arguments were undeniable, but because they 
presented an evaluative rhetorical posture that resonated with senators and could co­
exist with the scientific arguments proposed by CSA supporters. 
Although the rhetorical construction of others and their arguments has been 
discussed in the canon of rhetorical theory, with most studies indicating the use of 
prolepsis helps the rhetor’s cause, few studies have examined the way proleptic 
miscalculation has the potential to harm the interest of the rhetors doing the 
anticipating when it shifts from mere figural use to a systemically encouraged topos. 
With the CSA, the decision to anticipate opponents’ arguments against the bill as 
focusing on scientific grounds actually did more to harm the CSA supporters’ cause 
than a decision to imagine an array of arguments. In fact, one could even claim using 
prolepsis for the scientific arguments was successful in shifting the opponents toward 
economic claims. Thus, CSA supporters, perhaps, did not use prolepsis to its fullest 
extent because they did not anticipate the economic arguments. This analysis falls in 
line with Hovland et al.’s (1967) brief observation that using prolepsis while omitting 
a significant component of counterarguments could produce undesired effects. When 
confronted with the actual opponents and their arguments, as opposed to the ones 
from the hearings, CSA supporters were not as prepared as they could have been for 
the omitted economic arguments. Inventional resources that could have stifled some 
of the opponents’ arguments went unused. The MIT study was only briefly referenced 
and only a handful of Senators actually engaged economic arguments. This is similar 
to Robert Cox’s observation that recent climate communication campaigns have 
become ‘‘non-adaptive’’ (2010, p. 122). However, the contribution this article makes 
to our understanding of rhetorical theory lies primarily in the connection between 
proleptic miscalculation and the orchestrated efforts within an institutionalized 
deliberative setting. Senate norms allowed individuals in positions of power to select 
witnesses and questions that directed the flow of discourse in the same direction. 
This analysis highlights the way prolepsis was adopted across texts in a singular and 
narrowly defined effort to pass legislation. Prolepsis should no longer be viewed as a 
simple stylistic figure that resides in singular texts, nor should prolepsis be seen as an 
‘‘old’’ or ‘‘classical’’ concept that is of no consequence for today’s rhetorical critics. 
Instead, it should now also be viewed as a powerful and inventional driver of 
environmental discourse alongside other genre-like or trope-oriented argument 
forms in our attempts to ‘‘recover the strategic’’ in climate-change communication 
(Cox, 2010, p. 122). 
Finally, there is also a critical and practical environmental communication 
suggestion to be made from this analysis. McCain and Lieberman repeated their 
attempts to rhetorically construct a scientific frame of analysis for a new version of 
the CSA in the three hearings held from late 2004 to early 2005. Once again, the CSA 
was defeated. To avoid repeating mistakes they made in 2003 through 2005, McCain 
and CSA supporters need to adjust their rhetoric to address better the economic 
arguments so passionately advanced by senators like Inhofe. Legislators who wish to 
introduce similar policies should also learn from this example. This case underscores 
the importance of engaging not just the scientific elements of climate change rhetoric, 
but also the non-scientific concerns such as economics. The arguments are available 
to those who believe climate change needs to be addressed; they simply must choose 
to invoke them if we are ever to have significant policy changes to address this 
pressing environmental problem. 
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